MLB Managers Have Become More Alike as Traditional Tactics Fade

| 5 min read

When managerial fingerprints fade

Baseball managers once left fingerprints on the game. Today, the numbers suggest that those differences have narrowed: teams vary less in how often they use tactics such as sacrifice bunts and intentional walks. For Baseball Prospectus, that shift also raises a question about what analysis can still tell us about managers. The change matters because measuring a manager depends, in part, on being able to distinguish one approach from another. When teams make similar choices, the numbers offer less room to identify a signature style.

Patrick Dubuque recently observed that the publication’s former focus on measuring managerial performance has dwindled to a few pages in its annual book. Steven Goldman, who helped create that feature, took the remark personally at first. He also concedes Dubuque has a point: the managers who once seemed to represent distinct strategic types now look more alike. That reaction captures two things at once: the attachment people can feel to work they helped build, and the possibility that the work has become less useful as the sport changes. The feature’s shrinking footprint is itself a sign that the editors may have fewer meaningful differences to describe.

The numbers show a narrower range

Sacrifice bunts provide one example. This year, the Tigers recorded nine, the fewest in the majors, while the Rays led with 45. Goldman wryly attributes Tampa Bay’s total to “that team with Taylor Walls.” Across MLB, the average was 23 bunts per team, roughly one a week. The leaders and laggards still differ, but the league average gives readers a sense of the scale: a tactic that once invited debate now appears only occasionally for many teams. The spread is real, yet a single season’s totals don’t by themselves explain why a club made those choices or whether the choices worked.

Intentional walks tell a similar story. The Astros led with 41, while the Rockies and Twins each issued 10. The league average was 18. Goldman calls the tactic “a weapon of self-harm,” and points to the Rockies’ restraint as sensible given their struggles. The Astros’ total, he adds, makes them look like “sabermetric apostates.” The gap between 10 and 41 is still substantial, but the figures sit within a much less dramatic range than the historical examples that follow. A count can establish that teams behaved differently; it can’t settle whether the difference came from a manager’s philosophy, the circumstances of particular games, or other choices around the roster.

Those figures sit far from the extremes associated with earlier managers. Gene Mauch ordered 150 sacrifice bunts in a season, even in a league with the designated hitter. Leo Durocher called for 75 intentional walks in a year. Such totals reflect a broader era in which managers’ preferences could produce strikingly different approaches. They’re useful as a point of comparison, though they don’t prove that every past manager had more influence or that the tactics were better. They do show why an effort to classify managerial styles once had more visible material to work with.

What the totals can and can’t explain

Season totals make the shift easy to see, but they’re a blunt instrument for explaining it. A sacrifice bunt or intentional walk is a discrete decision, so it can be counted and compared. Yet the count doesn’t reveal the full reasoning behind a call, the alternatives available in that moment, or how much responsibility belongs to the manager. Similar systems of measurement often capture actions more readily than the judgment surrounding them. That distinction matters when a publication moves from reporting what happened to making claims about who deserves credit or blame.

Here’s the thing: fewer visible differences don’t mean managers have stopped influencing games. They mean these particular tactics may give analysts less evidence for sorting managers into clear categories. The same count can reflect different situations, and a low total can arise from a team’s broader approach rather than one person’s preference. If you’re working in this space, the challenge is to separate a meaningful pattern from a number that looks distinctive simply because it’s easy to measure. A narrower range doesn’t erase managerial decisions; it makes them harder to isolate with this kind of comparison.

Old work, new perspective

Goldman’s reaction to Dubuque’s comment carries a personal history. An editor named Steven introduced manager notes and statistics to the Baseball Prospectus annual long ago, and Goldman remembers being proud of the feature. Seeing it dismissed stung, even though he believes the observation was accurate. That’s a familiar tension for anyone who helped establish a practice: its reduced role can feel like a judgment on the original work, even when the reason is that the subject has changed. The feature can have mattered then and still warrant less space now.

That tension is familiar in organizations with long histories: institutional memory fades, and people can lose track of who created a practice or why. Goldman compares it to discovering that a workplace custom has outlasted the reasons behind it. The hurt is real, but it doesn’t make the old practice essential. There’s an aside here that matters (and this is the part most people overlook): a custom’s history can explain why people care about it without proving that it still serves its original purpose. Remembering the effort behind a feature is different from showing that its current form answers readers’ questions.

His conclusion is less a defense of the annual feature than an acknowledgment that baseball has changed. If managers’ choices have converged, there may be less variation for a publication to quantify. The old numbers still document a more idiosyncratic game; today’s narrower spread suggests that managerial influence is harder to distinguish by tactics alone. That’s more significant than it looks. It changes the job of analysis: a useful account may need to explain the limits of the available counts, as well as report them.

What comes next for analysis

The figures don’t establish that managerial analysis has run out of purpose. They point to a narrower claim: bunts and intentional walks may no longer be enough to distinguish managers as sharply as they once did. A publication can still preserve the historical record and explain why the numbers look different, while being candid about what those numbers can support. That said, the value of an annual feature depends on whether it helps readers understand the game they’re watching now, not just the game its creators first set out to measure.

The numbers here are underwhelming as a portrait of sharply contrasting managerial identities. But that may be the story. A tighter spread can tell readers that a once-visible source of difference has faded, while leaving open where managerial influence now shows up. The evidence in these examples supports restraint: tactics alone offer a thinner basis for comparison. A limit, plainly stated.

Source: Steven Goldman · www.baseballprospectus.com